Discussion of Bradleys The Principles of Logic :: Bradley Principles Logic Essays

Discussion of Bradley's The Principles of Logic If I make the claim, â€Å"A wolf is a mammal,† I do not assert anything about my idea of a wolf, but rather something general about this real class of beasts. For Bradley, to admit this is to admit that ideas are general terms that refer to an independent reality. But notice that if, faced with one of these actual canines, I then say â€Å"Here is a wolf†, each term of this singular judgment is itself general and cannot possibly hope to capture in its particularity and wealth of detail the animal in question. If ideas are always general, then how can they relate to the real that presents itself as a unique event with determinate sensible content? They could just as easily be describing any wolf and any â€Å"here† without an adequate fit or representation of sensory experience. These are Bradley’s concerns in The Principles of Logic (PL)1, and since his proposed solutions to these problems were intended as a refutation of Hume’s empiricist psycholo gy and Mill’s doctrine of inference, and since they shaped if not antedated many of Russell’s achievements in logical theory, they call for careful attention.2 I must note, however, that Bradley is particularly frustrating insofar as he eschews any sustained metaphysical investigations, claiming that metaphysics is a matter separate from his logical concerns. Just at the point that one would demand a more determinate account, he remarks that to really consider such questions would involve him in metaphysics, which is not his present objective. However, as I hope to show, his entire theory of judgment rests on a clearly metaphysical consideration of the nature of time and space and, in fact, commits him to rather bizarre claims about the nature and function of singular judgments and indexicals. The notion that objects of experience are themselves symbolic will allow Bradley to unite his metaphysic with his theory of intentionality and eventually fund those features of his account that are particularly relevant to our purposes: viz., his anti-psychologism, from which naturally follows his attack on the impoverished apophantic paradigm in logi c, his insistence on a distinction between logical and grammatical form, and his claim that all judgments, properly understood, are hypothetical judgments. I. Reference We must first gain an appreciation for how pervasive the notion of reference is in Bradley’s account. In this section I will first characterize the